Choice Experiments: identifying preferences or production functions? by Gibson, Fiona L. & Burton, Michael P.
ISSN 1835-9728 
 
Environmental Economics Research Hub  
Research Reports 
 
Choice Experiments:  identifying preferences 
or production functions? 
 
Fiona Gibson and Michael Burton 
 





About the authors 
 
Fiona Gibson is a PhD student within the School of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the 
University of Western Australia. 
 
Michael Burton is a Professor within the School of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the 
University of Western Australia 
 
 
  1Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports are published by The Crawford 
School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, Canberra 0200 Australia. 
 
These Reports present work in progress being undertaken by project teams within the 
Environmental Economics Research Hub (EERH). The EERH is funded by the Department of 
Environment and Water Heritage and the Arts under the Commonwealth Environment Research 
Facility. 
 
The views and interpretations expressed in these Reports are those of the author(s) and should not 
be attributed to any organisation associated with the EERH. 
 
Because these reports present the results of work in progress, they should not be reproduced in 













Crawford School of Economics and Government 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au 
  2TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
A b s t r a c t           4  
1.    Introduction  and  scope         5 
2    Preferences  for  environmental  goods       6 
2.1    Are  preferences  stable?           7 
2.2    Information  effects         8 
2.3    Effects  of  prior  knowledge        12 
2.4    Information  processing           12 
3   A new approach to investigating preference stability        15 
3.1    Application  to  environmental  valuation       16 
3.2   Insight into expert and public environmental preferences       19 
4    Implications  for  choice  experiments         20 
4.1   Experiment design and data requirements          20 
5    Conclusions          25 




  3Abstract 
This paper presents an alternative perspective on the process by which respondents consider options 
within choice experiments.  Building on the “new” model of consumer demand by Stigler and Becker 
(1977), it suggests that the attributes within choice experiments are not valued directly, but are used to 
generate higher level “constructs” (i.e. improvement in the environment) which are then valued.  The 
implication is that what are currently viewed as marginal utilities of attributes are in fact marginal 
utilities of an environmental outcome mixed with (subjective) marginal productivity of the attribute to 
achieving the environmental outcome.   It is suggested the Hierarchical Information Integration 
methods may allow one to separately identify the utility and production functions, and identify 
individual heterogeneity therein. 
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1. Introduction and scope 
In a democratic society where government expenditure is funded through public taxes, the public have 
considerable influence in directing spending of public funds. Through voting for particular candidates, 
and lobby groups, elected governments are given signals as to what the public desires their taxes to be 
spent on. Yet the result of an election can seldom be regarded as an unequivocal indication of public 
desires (Bowen, 1944). And it would be prohibitively expensive to use referenda to decide on all 
public expenditure decisions.   
Many have enlisted samples of individuals, for purposes of polls, surveys, interviews etc. (Bowen, 
1944).  However these methods have been criticised for not capturing tradeoffs between public 
programs. Furthermore, the public is criticised as lacking complete, consistent, and unrealistic 
preferences on most public policy issues, wanting to spend more on everything without considering 
the tradeoffs required in implementing government budgets (Hansen, 1998). Although, this critique 
may be better directed at the survey instrument than the individuals. 
Policy makers could refer to the market to provide information on how much people will pay for some 
public goods, such as health care, however a problem arises when the price system is not able to 
provide a complete measure of value for public goods (Hanemann, 1994). This is often the case for 
environmental goods, where related markets are missing.  
Policy makers could also refer to experts for guidance on how funds should be spent. This has 
occurred with environmental policy where government relies on expert opinion to direct expenditure. 
One example is the development of NRM policy in Australia, which was dominated by expert based 
decisions in the early days, but is now more open to public opinion through regional governance 
structures and consultation (Cleland, 2008). 
Hanemann (1994) questions whether expert judgement is an alternative to consulting the public. 
Whilst experts can determine the biophysical affects on the environment and assess the costs of 
alternative actions, he states that this is different to assessing what something is worth. If it were true - 
the experts cannot capture true value of a environmental good - then the policy maker may be unable 
to select an optimal choice of action.  
Stated preference (SP) techniques are used to assign money values to outcomes of choices about 
policies, projects and programmes (Bateman et al., 2002). The value of the good is assumed to be the 
respondent’s willingness to pay for a hypothetical change in the provision of that good.  However the 
willingness to pay values obtained from stated preference techniques have been criticised as 
inaccurate, unreliable and invalid. Several factors have been found to affect this inconsistency in 
preferences elicited, yet most relate to the respondents information set and cognitive ability to process 
the valuation task. If the public are indeed incapable of expressing coherent and reliable preferences 
(as opposed to holding them), a key question is whether their true preferences are really divergent to 
experts?  
Literature comparing public and expert preferences for environmental goods is sparse (McCartney, 
2009; Arãna et al., 2006; Goodman et al., 1998; Kenyon and Edwards-Jones, 1998; Groom et al., 
2007; Carlsson et al., 2008; Colombo et al., 2009). Given an experts prior knowledge of the good, 
experience in decision making and a likely higher cognitive ability to process information, it is 
thought that preferences would diverge between experts and the public. The public may also have 
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or management option that leads to a particular outcome).   
If the inherent difference between public and expert samples is the level of prior knowledge and 
ability to use new information, changing information levels could potentially affect the system at two 
levels: (1) to change preferences for the public good, or (2) to change ones understanding of the 
process by which the public good is ‘produced’, and hence the value of any particular intervention. 
This is analogous to the new theory of consumer behaviour, proposed by Michael and Becker (1973) 
and tested in Stigler and Becker (1977). The theory proposes a model which distinguishes between 
preferences for high level constructs, and derived demands for ‘goods’ that the household uses to 
produce these constructs.  The marginal value or shadow prices for the goods may vary as 
information/ technology/social- and personal-capital varies, both across individuals and across time. 
In other words fixed, or stable, preferences for fundamental “commodities” are produced by “goods” 
of which consumption of these good varies with the respondents information and cognitive ability.   
The aim of this study is to determine whether the conceptual model proposed by Michael and Becker 
(1973) is suitable for investigating the preference structure for environmental goods.  Particularly, 
whether differences that previous studies have observed between groups or between information 
treatments are due to differences in fundamental preferences, or changes in an understanding of how 
management options will deliver outcomes. The value of the conceptual model in exploring 
differences in expert and public preferences will also be considered.    
This discussion is divided into a number of sections. Section 2 outlines the theory behind preference 
elicitation for non-market goods, issues and criticisms of these techniques are discussed, and a review 
of the literature pertaining to the effect of information and prior knowledge on preferences for 
environmental goods given. Section 3 outlines how the new theory of consumer choice can be applied 
to unpack the decision process for valuing environmental goods, with particular reference to expert 
vs. public preferences. In section 4 we present two survey design options and guidance to estimation. 
Section 5 concludes by outlining further research requirements before implementation of the new 
theory of consumer choice.  
 
2. Preferences for environmental goods 
Before we proceed, we will provide a brief definition of what is meant by ‘preferences’.   For the 
purposes of this paper we work with a very tight, technical definition: preferences are represented by 
the arguments, parameters and functional form of the utility function of the individual.  Stability of 
preferences therefore implies stability of these features.  Anomalies such as “preference reversals” are 
interpreted as observed behaviour that is inconsistent with a well behaved, stable utility function.  We 
maintain the separation between preferences as defined, and behaviour (revealed or stated) that is 
(hypothesised to be) conditioned by those preferences.
1  
Standard economic theory assumes a rational consumer with well defined preferences, that do not 
depend on the methods used to elicit the preference nor on the description of the options (Bettman et 
al. 2006). Economic preferences for goods and services are usually revealed through market choices. 
Consideration of non-marketed goods cannot rely on a market to assign values through prices (e.g. 
increased species biodiversity), or costs (e.g. increased air pollution).  
                                                      
1 In this framework “attitudes” are manifestations of unconstrained (or incompletely constrained) preferences. 
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SP techniques are an empirical approach to measuring economic concepts (Hanemann, 1999). Two 
such techniques, contingent valuation (CV) and choice experiments (CE) have been used extensively 
to value a variety of non-market goods which include environmental assets, public transport routes, 
health services and new consumer products.  
SP techniques are used to obtain economic values for goods, by presenting the individual with a 
hypothetical market in which they are asked to express their willingness to pay (WTP) for a change in 
provision to the good. The CV technique offers the respondent a choice between maintaining the 
status quo of a good or paying for a change in provision of the good. In this paper we focus our 
discussion on CE’s, although some examples given are from CV studies. 
A CE is currently the most popular SP tool due to the respondent evaluating several policy options 
within the one survey framework. Lancasters’ (1966) theory of the characteristics of value provides 
the economic theory on which choice experiments (CE) were formed. Lancaster forwarded the 
previous consumer theory by saying that goods are not just goods; rather there are intrinsic properties 
of a good which determine utility. The properties or attributes of each good are assumed to 
collectively equal the value of the whole good. 
A choice set consists of alternative options, each of which consist of several attributes chosen by the 
researcher. The respondent chooses their preferred option based on the collective utility they derive 
from the attributes within the options, including their cost.  In terms of environmental public goods, 
each option can be considered as an alternative policy. The respondent then chooses there preferred 
policy option. The attributes of particular value to the respondent and the total economic value of the 
good can be determined (Bateman et al, 2002).    
 
2.1 Are preferences stable? 
Many have argued that economic choice theory is an inadequate approach to understanding consumer 
decision making (e.g. Bettman, 1979; Spash, 2002; Fujii and Garling, 2003; Azjen, 2004). Gary 
Becker, a staunch advocate of rational choice theory, argues not that all behaviours conform to the 
notion of stable preferences rather that the economists approach to explain behaviour provides the 
most generality and power than any other approach (Stigler and Becker, 1977) 
Others point to the variety of problem-solving modes, rules and heuristics individuals adopt when 
choosing between options (McFadden, 1999). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) conclude that the 
susceptibility of preferences to variations of framing raises doubt over the feasibility and adequacy of 
coherent preferences as the sole criterion of rational choice. Slovic (1995) points to the evidence on 
preference reversals (e.g. Tversky and Thaler, 1990), as contradictory to individuals maximising their 
utility.  
Economic theory does not deny preferences are a construct (Hanemann, 1994): individuals are not 
born with a pre determined preference map. The survey design and context may exert an influence on 
preference expression, either through a process of preference construction through the survey 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006) or through demand characteristics of the survey, which are defined as 
“the totality of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject” (Orne, 1962). 
McFadden (1999) cautions that valuation exercises for non-market goods may not invoke a utility 
  7maximising response, due to valuation questions being posed in ways that make them vulnerable to 
rule-driven responses. However Hanemann (1994) concludes, 
“One cannot avoid the fact that surveys, like all communication, are sensitive to nuance and context and are bound by the 
constraints of human cognition.” (Hanemann, 1994. p 27) 
There has been ongoing research into maximising the validity of responses from stated preference 
methods, by refining the survey instrument. Yet McFadden questions whether they can be eliminated 
entirely.  
 
2.2 Information effects 
SP techniques essentially demonstrate a transfer of information. A researcher, through the survey 
method, conveys information about the good being valued and respondents, in turn, provide 
information on their value of the good (Boyle, 1989).  
The issue with valuing public goods is that they are often unfamiliar to the respondent in a market 
setting. With marketed goods the price conveys information about the good and may, in certain 
circumstances, equalize information sets across all individuals (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1981). For 
instance if one stock-market  trader learns something significant about a traded company, this 
information may be transmitted to others on the market when the trader buys stock. Information could 
also be filtered through the media. However even with traded goods such an outcome may be rare 
(Munro and Hanley, 1999), and with non-market goods near impossible. 
In light of this issue, information disclosure in contingent markets is to a large extent the 
responsibility of the researcher. Yet there has been much debate in the literature over the quantity and 
framing of information provided. Randall et al. (1974) argued the need for adequate information to 
make the hypothetical market plausible. The NOAA panel recommended  
‘‘Adequate information must be provided to respondents about the environmental program that is offered. It must be defined 
in a way that is relevant to damage assessment’’ (Arrow et al., 1993).  
Table 1.  Summary of results on the sensitivity of WTP to information provision. 
Study Good  Information  levels  Result 




2 groups: (1) did not explicitly 
remind respondents of beneficial 
wetland services; (2) reminded 
respondents of beneficial wetland 
services. Negative consumption 
services of wetlands were not 
provided. 
Wetland services information 
provided to group (2) induced a 
significantly higher WTP 
estimate.  




2 groups: (1) shown film on 
humpbacks; (2) shown film on 
making a TV commercial. 
No significant difference in WTP 
between groups before or after 
the films despite group (1) having 
significantly more whale 
sightings than group (2). 
Zero bids were excluded from the 
analysis, and hence increased 
WTP for both groups. 
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Study Good  Information  levels  Result 






  (1) no information; (2) 
information on physical 
appearance; (3) information on 
endangered species and status; (4) 
information on endangered 
species, status and physical 
appearance. Respondents were 
given a fixed amount of money to 
be distributed amongst the 3 
species after each information set. 
Given no information mean 
allocation was not significantly 
different across unknown 
species. Given detail on physical 
appearance and endangered 
species status, mean allocation 
differed significantly across 
species. 




2 groups: (1) no information; (2) 
information on wilderness 
designation in Utah. 
Detailed information on 
wilderness designation did not 
significantly impact WTP. 
Boyle (1989)  Wisconsin brown 
trout fishery 
(USA)  
3 groups: (1) basic commodity 
description; (2) basic commodity 
description, brown trout stocking 
efforts and catch composition; (3) 
basic commodity description, 
brown trout stocking efforts, catch 
composition and program cost. 
The commodity specific 
information provided to groups 2 
and 3 did not significantly affect 
mean WTP. However the 
estimated variance of WTP 
values between groups was 
significantly changed. 




3 groups: (1) reclaimed grassland 
presented as a replacement for 
Clear Creek wetland, no 
information on related wetlands 
provided; (2) reclaimed wetland 
presented as a replacement for 
Clear creek wetland; (3) 
reclaimed grassland and nearby 
undisturbed environmental good 
presented as a replacement for 
Clear Creek wetland. Information 
on a reclaimed wetland is 
provided. 
Information provided on 
substitute environmental goods 
decreased the WTP estimate. 
Hanley and Munro (1992)  Dorset heathland 
(UK) 
4 groups: (1) control; (2) site-
specific; (3) endangered habitat; 
(4) all. 
No impact on WTP with different 
information levels. 





2 groups: (1) high information; 
(2) low information. 
Low information group generated 
more zero values and a greater 
range in their WTP response. 
When outlier responses  were 
removed, there was a significant 
difference in WTP between high 





2 groups: (1) economics students 
hence no background knowledge, 
WTP measured after low and high 
information; (2) wildlife students, 
hence background knowledge, 
WTP measured after low and high 
information.   
WTP was significantly higher for 
the wildlife students. WTP for 
group (1) was significantly 
different when given higher 
information. WTP for group (2) 
was not significantly different 
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Study Good  Information  levels  Result 
Hoehn and Randall (2000)  Coeur d’Alene 
River basin 
(USA) 
1 group: 8 pieces of information 
are given on resource injury and 
the perceived resource injury is 
assessed after each piece of 
information. WTP is elicited at 
the end of the information 
provision.  
WTP varies with perceived 
injury. The affect of new 
information is different given 
respondents prior knowledge. 





3 groups: (1) low information 
provided; (2) low  and advanced 
information provided; (3) low and 
advanced information given 
before group discussion. WTP 
was elicited after each 
information set was provided. 
Final mean WTP is significantly 
different from initial mean WTP, 
suggesting that time to think and 
additional information were 
influential. However there is no 
significant different in WTP with 
low and advanced levels of 
information provided. 




3 groups: (1) low information 
provided; (2) low, advanced and 
negative information provided; 
(3) low, advanced and negative 
information provided, group 
discussion. WTP was elicited 
after each information set was 
provided. 
Level of information provided 
and group discussion did not 
significantly influence mean 
WTP. However mean WTP for 
participants in the low 
information group (1) 
significantly decreased after 
being provided with the negative 
information on wind power.   




3 groups: (1) basic factual 
information; (2) basic scientific 
information; (3) subjective 
information on importance of the 
lakes for research. The 
information levels were 
constructed using survey results 
from an expert sample. 
WTP increased with more 
complex information, although 
not in a uniform manner.  
Shapansky, Adamowicz 




3 groups: (1) well informed 
through workshops, interaction 
with researchers and assistance 
with the CM survey; (2) medium 
informed through a workshop an 
assistance with the CM survey; 
(3) no prior information or 
involvement.    
No difference in WTP between 
group 1 and group 3.  
Hanley et al (2009a)  The Lake District 
woodland cover 
(UK) 
Information provided is two 
travellers’ historical view of the 
landscape. 4 groups: (1) no 
historical view; (2) negative 
historical view; (3) positive 
historical view; (4) both historical 
views.  
Historical view did not 
significantly affect respondent’s 
choice of land use.  
Hanley et al (2009b)  The Trossachs 
woodland cover 
(UK) 
Provision of historical land use. 4 
groups: (1) no historical land use 
map; (2) historical map from 
1750s; (3) historical map from 
1890; (4) both maps.  
Respondents who were shown a 
map of historical woodland cover 
were more likely to support a 
change in woodland cover. When 
the 1750s map was shown alone 
and with the 1890 map the 
probability of choosing a decline 
in woodland cover decreased.   
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specificity of information provided to respondents through the survey. It has been established by 
Samples et al. (1986b) and Boyle (1989) that commodity specific information does influence WTP.  
For example Samples et al. (1986) found when the species physical appearance was identified, 
respondents allocated a greater amount of money to the monkey and when the endangered species 
status was identified (not endangered, endangered with no salvation and endangered with salvation), 
respondents allocated a significantly greater amount of money to the rat, which was identified as 
endangered but salvageable ($21.60 opposed to $3.37 and $4.86 for the rabbit and monkey 
respectively).  The authors conclude it is clear that information disclosure can influence an individuals 
budget allocation strategy.  
Yet one would argue that the information provided by Samples et al. (1986b) was necessary for the 
respondent to make an informed allocation decision, as the initial allocation of funds was for 
unknown species. MacMillan et al. (2006a) found that WTP for an unfamiliar good, the reintroduction 
of the red kite, increased with addition information. When valuing a familiar good, wind generated 
power, MacMillan et al. (2006b) found that a higher level of information did not change WTP. It 
could be that information has a nonlinear effect on preferences, in that more and more information 
does not make for clear, well defined preferences (Bergstrom et al., 1990). We will discuss this 
further in the next section. 
It may be difficult to provide an information set with clearly defined benefits and costs of the good. 
The information provided by Samples et al. (1986b) could be construed as specific, yet balanced. On 
the other hand, Bergstrom et al. (1990) conceded that additional information provided to respondents 
in their second surveyed sample only describes beneficial attribute consumption. Negative attribute 
consumption was not given to respondents.  
Hanley et al. (2009a) attempt to test respondent’s resilience to the framing of information provided by 
giving respondents positive and negative literary views of the Lakes District. Their results were 
inconclusive in that no significant difference in choice probabilities was found given the different 
literary views.  However when respondents learnt that a landscape had changed over time, they were 
less likely to desire it to remain fixed or unchanged.   
MacMillan et al. (2006b) looked at the impact of providing negative consumption values on WTP for 
energy generated from wind power. With low information, respondents WTP decreased after a 
negative report on wind power. However with high information, WTP remained stable yet the number 
of unsure respondents increased. The authors conclude that respondents provided with a high level of 
information within the survey were more resilient to negative information. 
There is inconclusive evidence on the impact of differing levels of information on WTP estimates. 
The effect of information seems also to be dependent on its specificity and framing. Samples et al. 
(1986a), Hanley and Munro (1992), Pope and Jones (1988), Boyle (1989), MacMillan et al. (2006) 
and Shapansky et al. (2008) all found no impact on WTP when additional information was provided 
to respondents.  
 
  112.3 Effects of prior knowledge   
It is possible that the respondent is well informed on the good (termed prior knowledge throughout the 
rest of the paper). Evidence in the literature suggests that the effect of new information provided 
within the survey depends on how much it differs to the respondents prior knowledge (Hoehn and 
Randall, 2000).  
Pope and Jones (1988) found no difference between WTP when specific information on wilderness 
designation was provided to respondents, and concluded that this was due to higher prior knowledge 
of respondents as the issue of wilderness designation was being actively debated in the community at 
the time of the survey
2. The respondent’s level of prior knowledge of wilderness designation was not 
formally measured within the survey, and hence not tested within the model. 
Tkac (1998) used university students studying two different disciplines to value the Harlequin duck. 
Students studying wildlife were assumed to have background knowledge, while students studying 
economics were assumed not to have background knowledge. The WTP estimate for the wildlife 
students did not change (significantly) after additional information on the Harlequin duck was 
provided. After additional information, WTP estimates did change significantly for the economics 
students.  
In comparing public and expert preferences, where prior knowledge is thought to by influential, 
Goodman  et al. (1998) found that both groups were consistent in their identification of the 
conservation quality of coastal sites, however differed on management strategies. Kenyon and 
Edwards-Jones (1998) found that by including ecological data the public group valued the sites 
similarly to the expert group. However there are significant issues with their comparison of the 
estimates:  the public and experts were valuing different aspects of the good in question (Kenyon and 
Edwards-Jones, 1998) and both studies use different elicitation methods for the public and expert 
samples (McCartney, 2009).  
Direct comparison between public and expert preferences for an innovative cancer screening program 
is investigated by Arãna et al. (2006). Social science students, assumed unfamiliar with health issues, 
were surveyed along with academics and professionals who have oncology knowledge and experience 
in the medical field experienced in oncology. Prior knowledge did not alter the attribute parameters 
and WTP estimates. 
 
2.4 Information processing 
In half of the studies reviewed in section 2.3, the information provided to respondents was identified 
as a possible cause of discrepancies in preferences from stated preference surveys. In particular, there 
is support for variability in preferences, given additional information, when the public good is 
unfamiliar to the respondent (McMillan et al., 2006; Samples et al., 1986; Groom et al., 2007). Slovic 
et al. (1982) argue that there is need to provide extra information to offset the systematic biases that 
                                                      
2 The detailed information supplied to respondents in the survey was not given in the paper and hence its content is not 
known. However it was noted that at the time of the survey there was significant debate in the community about competing 
uses of reserved parks, and how these weren’t compatible with a designation “wilderness area”.  
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effect of information on WTP is not an undesirable bias, rather information increases the 
completeness and accuracy of the preferences elicited. 
However to what extent do differences in the cognitive ability of respondents to process information 
and too much information hinder the respondents decision process? Bergstrom et al. (1990) note that 
the information provided to respondents is likely to have a nonlinear relationship with the preference 
given. Grether and Wilde (1983) investigate “information overload”, yet found the subjects in their 
experiments were not affected and appeared able to ignore unnecessary or unwanted information. 
Respondent’s cognitive processes are complex and the complexity of choice experiments has posed 
issues in terms of the cognitive burden imposed on respondents. Survey length and the number and 
type of attributes included are pointed to by choice experiment practitioners as the usual culprits, and 
accounted for accordingly.  
Yet the issue is potentially far more complex. The affect of heuristics and decision rules on choice has 
been recognised by economists and psychologists for some time (Simon 1955; Slovic and 
Lichtenstein 1968). In particular Simon (1955) points to the transaction cost of information 
processing, suggesting individuals satisfy their wants to avoid the full cognitive cost of complexity 
contained within the choice task. Grether and Wilde (1983) find that untrained people do use 
simplifying strategies in quite complicated decision problems. Additionally a large body of work from 
psychology centres on preference inconsistency due largely to the complexity of choice tasks and 
variation in human cognition (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). 
Attribute selection was highlighted by Nobel Laureat Daniel McFadden in his address.  
“The potentially important role of perceptions, ranging from classical psychophysical perception of attributes, through 
psychological shaping of perceptions to reduce dissonance, to mental accounting for times and costs, remains largely 
unexplored in empirical research on economic choice.” (McFadden, 2001, p 373) 
This issue of recognising and accounting for the transaction costs involved with attribute selection has 
been receiving increasing attention in the environmental valuation literature (Cameron and DeShazo 
2008). 
DeShazo and Fermo (2002) empirically tested preferences from CE’s and found that the complexity 
of the choice set (i.e. number of alternatives and attributes) affected the consistency of respondents 
choices. To deal with the cognitive issues involved with choice tasks, whilst upholding a rational 
choice model, DeShazo and Fermo (2002) find the effects can be mitigated by choosing the optimal 
number of alternatives and correlation structure of attributes, and can be identified and controlled for 
in the analysis by using heteroscedastcity models.  
The causal relationship, or correlation, between attributes and the effect on choice was explicitly 
investigated by Blamey et al. (2002). If some attributes are causally related (i.e. that the level of one 
attribute is viewed as being a precursor, at an ecological level, for another), some respondents may 
pay more attention to their relationship when comparing alternative options. This could lead to 
assigning greater meanings to options with casually related attributes, and potentially causing 
respondents to simplify the decision making process (Blamey et al., 2002). An example is given in 
Text Box 1. 
Blamey et al. (2002) propose reducing the extent to which respondents have issues with causally 
related attributes in choice tasks by (1) excluding the causal attribute (2) explaining to respondents 
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and (4) removing nonsensical attribute combinations from the choices model.  However, all four of 
these strategies may conflict with the desired design properties of the experiment. 
Gregory  et al. (1993) propose redefining the stated preference techniques to accommodate their 
known cognitive issues. Preference construction is encouraged through time to think, more 
information and possibly group discussion. MacMillan et al. (2006) used the approach to value an 
unfamiliar good, the red kite, using the three rounds of value estimates. They gave participants 
additional information and the opportunity for group discussion, and then up to 2 weeks before 
eliciting their WTP through a CV survey. The authors conclude that the approach may be a more 
appropriate methodology for valuing unfamiliar goods. 
Using choice modelling, Shapansky et al. (2008) investigated the effect of information and 
respondents prior knowledge, accumulated over workshops and feedback from experts, on stated 
preferences for passive use values of forests in Saskatchewan, Canada.  Preferences were elicited for 
forest management options, given attributes of moose and caribou population size, forest age, 
recreation restrictions and forest access, amount of protected areas, forestry employment and change 
to household income tax. The highly informed and involved group did not display significantly 
different preferences nor was the variance in preferences significantly different from those who were 
not informed or involved.  
Bateman  et al. (2009) explore the issue of evaluability of conventional numerical modes of 
information provision within the choice set. They do this by comparing current practice with a virtual 
reality exercise to convey policy options to respondents. Attributes in the standard approach allowed 
for both loses and gains. A strong loss aversion heuristic was influential in the decision making. In 
comparison, the virtual reality exercise, which presented respondents with visual representation of the 
same attributes (and their levels), resulted in marked lower loss aversion effect. Additional there was a 
decrease in the error variance in the visual reality exercise, suggesting more certainty in preferences/ 
less influence of other heuristics (Bateman et al., 2009).   
Whilst these approaches may reduce the cognitive burden when choosing between options, the 
researcher is no closer to understanding whether the cognitive process, information provided and 
respondents prior knowledge changes fundamental preferences. It’s possible that these factors change 
the respondents understanding of how those outcomes are produced. Our example given in Text Box 
1 illustrates this point. Frank and Bella value the same outcome, yet their understanding of how the 
outcome is generated differs and hence their inferred preference structure for the policy as presented 
differs. In the next section we focus on developing an alternate model for testing preference stability, 
using CE’s as the explicit example. 
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Text Box 1 
An environmental policy aimed at conserving forest biodiversity targets outcomes of 
increased areas of native vegetation, a decrease the loss of threatened species and increase 
in the number of plant species.  
Frank is an economics student who highly values conserving forest biodiversity yet he has 
no prior knowledge of forest ecosystems. Seeing all outcomes as credible options, Frank 
distributes his preferences evenly across all three.  
Bella is an ecology student and also highly values conserving forest biodiversity. Through 
her studies she knows that by increasing the area of vegetation, the number of plant species 
will increase and there is a good chance the number of threatened species will decrease. 
Bella prefers the policy option which achieves outcomes of larger areas of vegetation, 
knowing it is inherently linked to increasing plant species and decreasing the number of 
threatened species.  
Given their preferences for outcomes, Frank and Bella’s utility functions will seem quite 
different: Frank’s selected options reveal he is placing weights on  large areas of 
vegetation, more plant species and a decrease in threatened species, while Bella’s reveal 
that she is making choices based only on large areas of vegetation. The researcher may 
conclude that respondents with prior knowledge have different preferences to respondents 
with no prior knowledge. However both highly value biodiversity conservation, yet differ 
in the way they believe it will be achieved.  
 
3. A new approach to investigating preference stability 
Its currently not clear through the literature whether the information provided to respondents, the 
respondents prior knowledge and cognitive processes change preferences for environmental goods. 
An alternate explanation is that they change the respondents understanding of the process by which 
the good is “produced” (i.e. the specific technology or management option that leads to a particular 
outcome). In the following discussion we focus on preferences derived through choice experiments 
(CE). 
The Lancaster (1966) theory of the characteristics of value provides the economic theory on which 
choice experiments (CE) were formed. Lancaster extended previous consumer theory by saying that 
goods are not just goods; rather there are intrinsic properties of a good which determine utility. The 
properties or attributes of each good are assumed to collectively equal the whole value of the good. 
Michael and Becker (1973) modified the theory of consumer behaviour further to provide a theory 
which is capable of explaining a wider range of behaviours than the old consumer choice theory. The 
principal conceptual novelty lies in determining utility by a set of “z commodities”, which are 
produced by the household from purchased goods and services.  
Under the new theory of consumer behaviour, the household seeks to maximise       
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with 
Zi=fi(X1i,..., Xki, t1i,..., tji, S1,..., Sl, Yi),   i=1...m   subject to M           (2) 
Where  Zi  are a set of produced commodities of choice entering the utility function. The Z 
commodities are produced by goods, the purchase of which are constrained by full income (including 
time endowments) M. Where fi is the production function for the ith commodity, Xji is the quantity of 
the jth market good (or service) used in the production of the ith commodity, tji is the jth person’s own 
time input, Sj the jth persons human capital and Yi represents all other inputs (Becker, 1996).  
In Lancaster’s model the good is “made-up” by a suit of characteristics. Whereas under the new 
theory of consumer behaviour the commodity is “produced” by goods via the production function 
(2).The production function is essentially a combination of inputs which produce an output 
(commodity).  
The preference for Z commodities is hypothesised stable, as they are envisaged to be more 
fundamental human requirements, and changes are seen only in the level of the goods that produce the 
commodities. Both Michael and Becker (1973) or Stigler and Becker (1977) provide minimal 
guidance on what these Z commodity’s are, simply stating they are objects of choice.   However, the 
minimal requirement is that some arguments of the utility function be defined over outcomes that 
have to be ‘constructed’ from the purchased goods and/or services. 
In some cases, Becker uses examples which are quite narrow (music appreciation, or nutrition), but in 
others the examples are quite broad i.e. “health, social standing and reputation, and pleasures of the 
senses” (Becker, 1996, p5). In the initial exposition, preferences for Z goods were suggested to be 
constant across time and individuals with all variation in observed behaviour due to heterogeneity in 
factors relating to the production function (2).  However, this is not a requirement for the model to 
generate potentially novel insights. 
Findings in the psychology literature lend support for this notion of high level utility determinants. 
The Schwartz Value Scale (Schwartz, 1992), presents a set of basic human values termed “universal 
values”. Extensive research in over 200 samples in more then 60 countries supported the 
comprehensiveness of the major, motivationally distinctive 10 values defined (Schwartz and Boehnke, 
2004).  It is possible that actions will generate opposing changes in the values, so that decisions 
require some degree of tradeoffs across them.  For example, benevolence values (enhancing the 
welfare of others) are likely to conflict with achievement values (seeking personal success for oneself) 
(Schwartz, 1992). 
 
3.1. Application to environmental valuation 
Essential, using the conceptual model to elicit fundamental preferences for environmental outcomes 
provides a way to account for heterogeneity in the understanding of how the outcomes are generated. 
Attributes used in the CE would then take on the form of “intermediate inputs”, and the respondent 
provides preferences for final outcomes, which are dependent upon those “intermediate inputs”. The 
influences of information provision, prior knowledge on the understanding of how the attributes 
generate the final outcomes, and divergence in individuals cognitive processes, can be accounted for.  
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of an iconic river system, a policy maker decides to run a choice experiment to provide guidance on 
expenditure of public funds to improve the quality of the river system. A set of management outcomes 
are chosen, in consultation with land managers and scientists, to target river quality. They are level of 
nitrogen pollution runoff into the river, preservation of riverside vegetation and reduction in the 
number of non-native fish species within the river. Respondents are asked to choose between options 
which offer different levels of these attributes given a certain cost to the tax payer (respondent). For 
simplicity we assume the river system has only non-use values to the individual. The traditional 
model has the household seeking to maximise utility defined as,  
U=f(Pollution,  Veg,  Fish,  Tax)          (3) 
However, the new conceptual model suggests that the utility function should be expressed in terms of 
a constructed Z good, river quality. 
U=f(Zenv,   T a x )             ( 4 )  
The change in the level of river quality implied by the management outcomes is derived through a 
subjective production function: 
Zenv= g ( P o l l u t i o n ,   V e g ,   F i s h )           ( 5 )  
The expected value of river quality, E(Zenv), is a score of how well the respondent thinks each 
combination of the attributes “produce” the desired outcome. In the production function (5), it is 
important to note that respondents are not revealing preferences, but their understanding of how the 
actions they are being asked to fund will have an impact on the higher level construct they actually 
value.  In this specification, a large part of the action is focused on what is happening with the 
production function, and not the utility function.  For example, it would be more accurate to express 
the problem as one of expected utility: 
Ui=f(E(Zenv) ,   T a x )            ( 6 )  
E(Zenv)=g(Pollution, Veg, Fish| Ii,Ki)          ( 7 )  
Variables I, information provided, and K, respondents prior knowledge, are now specific to individual 
i, and introduce heterogeneity in the expected production of the targeted outcome
3.  Thus, different 
personal capital stocks, either acquired prior to or during the experiment will introduce variations in 
the expected effectiveness of the outcomes.  This is analogous to the role of personal capital with the 
conventional model, except here that capital is not influencing the individual’s ability to personally 
generate the outcome, but their expectation of the outcome that will be generated by the government if 
it follows through its actions.  Poor prior understanding (or information provided) on the role of non-
native fish on reducing the quality of the eco-system may lead to a zero (expected) functional 
relationship between changing fish stocks and ecological quality for some people. 
One question that arises is whether this leads to a functional difference in the way that one interprets 
the outcomes from such a choice experiment. One response could be that, observationally, the 
outcomes are the same.  Substituting (7) into (6) gives: 
Ui=k(Pollution, Veg, Fish, Tax| Ii,Ki, )          ( 8 )  
                                                      
3 It is important to note that the role of information is strictly in the respondents understanding of the process 
which generates the outcome, as the respondents are not expected to actually implement the process itself.   
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that moderate parameters.  Without an extended experimental design (see below for some initial 
thoughts) estimation based on (8) is all that is possible, but note that what would be reported as 
marginal utilities from such a model are in fact composites of marginal utilities and production 
function parameters, and what are interpreted as differences in tastes will in fact be (in part) 
differences in expected efficacy of attributes on outcomes. 
One can extend the simple representation above to include multiple Z goods, and joint inputs.  Take a 
case study where the utility function is extended to include a use value associated with the river, such 
as fishing.  Assume the respondent is well informed: understands the ecological system and holds 
positive values for both its integrity and recreational fishing.   
Ui=f(E(Zenv), E(Zrec  ) ,   T a x )           ( 9 )  
E(Zenv)=g(Pollution, Veg, Fish| Ii,Ki)          ( 1 0 )  
E(Zrec)=h(Fish| Ii,Ki)            ( 1 1 )  
Reducing the level of non-native fish now operates on expected utility in two conflicting ways: it 
improves expected ecological quality, which increases utility, but reduces expected fishing quality.  
This implies that estimation of a reduced form function such as (8) will give parameters on the fish 
attribute that is a conflation of both marginal utility terms in (9), and the expected marginal 
productivity from both (10) and (11). 
Even without considering issues of implementation, looking at choice experiments in this framework 
starts to change the way that one conceptualises the cognitive process being followed by respondents.   
There are some echoes of this approach in the literature.  Bergstrom et al. (1990) recognise the 
approach within the context of revealed recreational trip data, yet seem not to follow through in terms 
of its implications:  
“Following household production theory, consumers combine environmental commodity characteristics with other 
non-rationed market commodities to "produce" consumption activities (e.g., recreational trips). Services or 
attributes associated with these activities generate utility (Becker, Stigler and Becker, Michael and Becker, Stoll).” 
p. 616, fn 1 
Blamey et al. (2002) identify that the changes in the attribute levels presented in a choice experiment 
have to be interpreted within an ecological production relationship,  
“When causally-related attributes are included in choice sets, a question arises as to how the associated relations 
are to be modelled from a production perspective. Whilst complex non-separable production functions can be 
assumed when predicting the environmental impacts of a policy proposal, these outcomes still need to be mapped 
into the attribute and label space of the experiment, if welfare estimates are to be obtained.” p. 184 
Rolfe et al. (2008) report on the possibility of including a single aggregate measure of outcome in a 
study of the Great Barrier Reef:   
“Given the need to introduce other attributes into the survey design, another option could be to combine all GBR 
attributes together into a single ‘Health of GBR’ index. While this would may limit feedback on preferences, and 
restrict the information that can be associated with different management options, it would have some 
advantages…It was an option favoured by focus group participants in the previous survey.” p. 9 
 
 
This suggests that respondents were comfortable with a single “Z commodity” being used.  In our 
framework we would suggest that this approach would in fact give good feedback on preferences, yet 
  18it would be limited in that any information on respondents understanding of the relationship between 
management actions and the outcome they value (i.e. the subjective expected production function). 
Gregory et al. (1993) explicitly recognise the possible inability, nay un-necessity, of respondents to 
understand ecological systems. They use the example of bird species preservation and question 
whether it is appropriate and pertinent to the research for the respondent to distinguish the effect that 
100 or 1000 pairs of birds has on species preservation.  
 
3.2. Insight to expert and public environmental preferences  
A relatively unexplored paradigm is the influence of prior knowledge, information and cognitive 
ability when comparing experts and public preferences. Given their complex nature, conflicting 
information provided by the media and general uncertainty of system functionality on a global scale, 
the public’s perceptions of how natural systems work are often oversimplified and incorrect (White, 
2008).  
An experts prior knowledge set has been learned over time, using a set of developed cognitive tools. 
They may also have experience in resource allocation, critical thinking and an understanding of 
complex environmental systems. The expert also has access to a wider range of information sources, 
and the cognitive ability to understand the information conveyed in these sources. 
In an investigation of the public’s beliefs of causal processes in complex natural systems, White 
(2008) found respondents were only able to think about one-way interactions. Green (2001) found that 
the majority of respondents had the capacity to think in terms of two-way interactions, but their 
capacity was overwhelmed by the complexity of the task.  
It is generally assumed that experts preferences would diverge from the public’s (Hanemann, 1994). 
However literature comparing public and expert preferences for environmental goods is sparse and 
predominantly limited to priming the respondent to “act” like an expert by providing them with 
“expert level” information (Kenyon and Edwards-Jones, 1998; Goodman et al. 1998; Groom et al., 
2007).  
Colombo et al. (2009) asked government officers to make judgements, using an Analytic Hierarchy 
Process, on the need for public access ways on behalf of the public. They compared this with 
preferences of the public elicited through a CE. They found no significant difference in preferences 
between government officers and the public, although they did use different methods to elicit 
preferences.   
Colombo et al. (2009) argue that if a CE was used to elicit expert preferences, a true comparison may 
not be possible: experts may not be seeking to maximise their own utility subject to income, as they 
could be representing their role as an agency officer. This assertion is dependent on how the valuation 
question is framed i.e. are the experts asked to respond on behalf of an institution, or themselves.  
However, if it is the former, it does raise issues relating to the payment vehicle, which is commonly 
designed as a personal payment to allow for monetary values to be assigned to attributes.  
Carlsson et al. (2008) do use CE’s for both expert and public samples. The experts were asked to 
choose alternatives they would recommend as a policy, and the public were asked to act as private 
citizens. They find attribute rankings and WTP differed between the two groups.   
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diverge, we refer to the conceptual model outlined above.  The role of technical understanding held by 
experts can be summarised as a particular stock of prior knowledge K.  Using the proposed 
framework, one has an immediate basis on which to identify whether it is the preference structure or 
the understanding of the technical production function that differs between experts and public.    
This raises the question of whether there are common traits amongst experts, regardless of field of 
study, which enable a unique decision process. Additionally, are experts preferences congruent in the 
way they evaluate the importance and role of attributes in achieving final outcomes (White, 2008; 
Morgan et al. 2001)? It is possible to use the conceptual model to answer these questions.  
 
4. Implications for choice experiments  
The challenge for the new approach is to find a mechanism that allows one to differentiate the 
production function from the utility function components of the valuation task.  As noted above in 
equation (7), if one does not have a mechanism to do so, then one is left with an observational 
equivalence between the proposed model, and the standard utility model extended for individual 
heterogeneity in preferences.   If one is to identify the two separate components, additional 
information needs to be generated that will allow identification of the expected production 
relationship.  Furthermore, one needs to make some judgement as to what the dimensions of the 
(unobserved) z goods are. 
 
4.1 Experimental design and data requirements 
A potential way to proceed with the design and analysis of CM surveys is to employ Hierarchical 
Information Integration (HII), first proposed by Louviere (1984), and which has had a number of 
implementations (e.g. Oppewal et al, 1994, Van Helvoort-Postulart et al 2009, Timmermanns et al 
2009, Molin, E.J. E. and Timmermans, H. J. P. 2009).  In part, the motivation of HII is to allow for 
the consideration of decisions over goods that have a large number of attributes.  It assumes that 
respondents can summarise responses across sub-sets of attributes, to form what are described as 
“Decision Constructs”, and then choices are made with consideration to these constructs.  The 
statistical design has to account for the fact that, over the sub-sets of attributes, it has to have 
properties that allow for the identification of the relationship between the attributes and their 
respective construct.   Within the design presented to individuals they are required to both make 
choices, and to rate a sub-set of attributes that define a single construct (see Figure 1 below). 
 
  20Figure 1  Example of an HII choice task, taken from Van Helvoort-Postulart et al, (2009). 
In this example, there are 3 constructs (equivalent to Z goods): Organisation, Cooperation partners 
and Patient-centeredness of care.  In the task presented above, only Organisation is represented by its 
full set of attributes (1-5 as listed) and the remaining 2 are represented by rating scores (in this case – 
or ++ in both cases).  As well as making a standard choice, respondents also have to rate the outcome 
delivered for Organisation.  In other split samples, respondents would see (and rate) the attributes of 
the other two constructs.   The rating process for the construct is equivalent to the expression of the 
expected production function within the conceptual model above.  It is important that the rating scores 
used for the constructs within a choice task (i.e. Cooperation above) are based on the same scale as 
the rating used to evaluate that construct, to ensure compatibility.  Not all attributes need to be linked 
to constructs: in this example status and time investment are treated as independent attributes.   
  Although motivated by a different perspective, the HII framework effectively describes the 
conceptual model above.  However, because the requirement in the current application is to identify 
the production relationship rather than use HII to deal with excessively complex attribute levels, it is 
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ratings information will be collected only for the ecological outcome in each alternative. It is 
interesting to note that in their review, Molin & Timmermans (2009) suggest that a key issue in its 
application is to investigate “heterogeneity.. in terms of different respondents or segments using 
different subsets of attributes or perhaps different decision constructs.”  i.e., in our terms, whether 
different individuals use different production functions. 
Essentially the survey would consist of two sections: determining the production process and 
preferences for the Z commodities. Firstly, respondents are asked to complete a set of technical 
evaluations of the construct or Z good. The instructions and question format could take the form given 
in Box 2: 
 
 
Text Box 2. Example of the question format used to generate the production function 
“Assuming the current status of your local marine ecosystem has a score of 50, please 
indicate the score that you think would be achieved given the stated changes,  with a score 
between 0-100 where 0 is the worst possible and 100 the best” 
 
Attribute 1  Attribute 2  Attribute 3  Attribute 4  Score 
Current    Current Current Current 50 
+20% +30% -10%  -10%  
-20% +30%  +25%  +20%  
+10% -30%  -10%  +30%  
 
 
There is no requirement for any cost consideration to be given: respondents are simply scoring 
outcomes based on how they understand the attribute levels to generate the outcome 
We propose two experimental designs to generate preferences for the Z commodities. In experiment 
1, a standard CE, defined over the 8 attributes used in determining the production function, is 
undertaken. By undertaking a standard CE, welfare estimates can still be obtained if the production 
function process doesn’t deliver meaningful results. Cost is included as an attribute (Text Box 3).  
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Text Box 3. Example of a choice set in experiment 1, which would be used to determine 
preferences for Z commodities 
 
Attributes   Status quo  Option 1  Option 2 
Attribute 1  Current  +20%  -20% 
Attribute 2   Current  +30%  +30% 
Attribute 3  Current   -10%  +25% 
Attribute 4  Current   -10%  +20% 
Cost   $0  $50  $70 
Choice      
 
 
Using information gained through the respondents understanding of the production process (Text Box 
2) and Experiment 1 (Text Box 3), a number of options in terms of estimation are available: 
1.  use the attribute levels to explain choices in the standard manner (which appears to be the 
standard approach in HII, with ratings used for validity tests only) 
2.  if all of the options used to define the choice sets have been scored, then estimate the choice 
model using the scores rather than the attributes (i.e. the choice model would include 2 
variables: a Z score and cost.  The Z  scores would be individual specific).  
3.  if all of the options have not been scored, estimate an individual specific production function 
that rationalises scores reported against attribute levels, and then predict individual specific 
scores for each element of the choice experiment.   
At this stage it is not clear whether estimation option 3 is less burdensome in terms of information 
needs.  The number of scores to be given in order to reliably predict the Z scores by individual is not 
known, and could be substantial.  However, alternative structures, such as Best-Worst scoring 
techniques may be more effective (Marley & Louviere, 2005).   
What one is anticipating is that a substantial degree of the individual heterogeneity will manifest itself 
within the scoring of alternate production functions, and hence one would expect to see significantly 
lower levels of heterogeneity in the parameters of the utility function estimated for 2 or 3 than in 
estimation option 1, where the parameters are conflating utility and process heterogeneity.  
In Experiment 1 the intention is to generate ex post the constructed Z good for inclusion in the 
estimated choice model.  An alternative, Experiment 2, is to directly include a measure of the Z good 
  23in the choice experiment, which is illustrated in Figure 4.  The choice experiment may be prefaced by 
a statement such as: 
 “In the following questions we will show you hypothetical changes in the status of your local marine 









Text Box 4. Example of a choice set in experiment 2 
 
  Status quo  Option 1  Option 2 
Z commodity  50  70  90 
Cost $0  $50  $70 
Choice      
 
 
The choice experiment contains only two attributes: a score for the Z commodity and a cost.   Under 
normal circumstances this process would be deemed very poor practice: although precise numerical 
values are being given for outcomes, the outcome itself is totally ambiguous.  There is no way to be 
sure that a change of e.g. +20% is being thought of in the same way be each person, in terms of 
changes in the environment  What is more, it gives no guidance for policy, as one has no means of 
linking the change in the score to any management actions.  Yet in the revised model, this is exactly 
what is required.  Choices are made conditional upon changes in the constructed environmental Z 
commodity, which by definition is known to the respondent, but opaque to the researcher.  
However, in order to make the link between choice experiment and management, one has to reveal 
that relationship for the individual, which again, one can do through a series of scoring questions that 
simply reveal how the Z commodity is constructed for that individual.   
The difference between the two versions (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) lies in what is presented to 
the individual: attributes which they then combine on the fly to generate the Z commodity, or some 
motivated measure of the Z commodity which has to be subsequently deconstructed by the researcher.  
Experiment 1 has certain attractions in that it allows one to compare the consequences of the 
alternative estimation strategies, whereas in experiment 2 one has no option but use the Z scores. 
In terms of exploring the implications of this re-focusing, one can make two hypothesis: that within 
Experiment 1, would expect there to be less heterogeneity in taste parameters if one uses the estimated 
Z scores as attributes as compared to using the attributes directly (because the latter included 
heterogeneity in the production function) and that information effects, in particular differences 
between expert and public samples, will manifest themselves in the production function, and not in 
the utility function.  
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In this working paper we reviewed current literature pertaining to the stability of preferences for 
environmental goods, particularly the impact of information provision, prior knowledge of 
respondents and cognitive processes. Despite the assertion by critics the reviewed studies failed to 
provide conclusive evidence that preferences elicited through stated preference techniques are invalid. 
The new theory of consumer behaviour (Michael and Becker, 1973; Stigler-Becker, 1977) provides a 
flexible conceptual model for investigating the central issue of this study: whether instability of 
preferences is due to changes in fundamental preferences, or changes in an understanding of how 
planned management change will deliver outcomes.  The influence of information provision, prior 
knowledge and cognitive processes on the understanding of how final outcomes are generated can be 
accounted for within the conceptual model. We outline three possible uses for the conceptual model: 
    investigating the impact of information and prior knowledge on fundamental preferences; 
    reducing the cognitive burden inherent in choice tasks; and 
    comparing fundamental preferences between public and expert samples. 
Although this approach to the valuation question was initially conceived as a way to think about the 
issue of information/knowledge differences between different groups, the approach has a potential to 
explore a number of issues within the valuation literature. For example, the issue of causally prior 
attributes arises when it is conceived that attributes are functionally linked (i.e. pollution levels and 
water quality) or that attributes are requisites for outcomes (Blamey et al., 2002).  Within the 
proposed set up, these issues are concentrated within the production function, not the utility function.  
In cases where there is no technical substitution between attributes in achieving the outcome (i.e. a 
Leontief production function), expected ecological outcomes will be determined by the binding 
minimum attribute. 
Where attribute levels appear to be technically inconsistent with each other (i.e. high numbers of a 
species even though, simultaneously, ecological attributes that support that species are said to be low) 
the uncertainty will likely manifest itself in high levels of uncertainty about the measure of the Z 
commodity, rather than how that commodity is valued per see.  
The apparent lack of sensitivity to scope in some valuation studies may reflect a particular ecological 
Z commodity and understanding, rather than a cognitive error or strong decreasing marginal utility.  
Thus, if the constructed Z commodity is the probability of persistence of a species,  then increasing 
species numbers beyond a certain threshold may genuinely generate only marginal increases in that 
probability. 
However a few issues must be resolved before the conceptual model could be implemented in the 
context of a choice experiment. For one, is possible that the amount of information required to 
accurately retrieve each individual’s production function is significant and coupled with several 
choice sets could add to the cognitive burden already encountered, hence defeating one purpose of the 
new approach. 
Its possible that this approach provides an interesting conceptual framework for thinking about the 
way that people respond to multi attribute choice experiments, but one which leads to observationally 
equivalent or operationally impractical field applications.  Its analogue in HHI provides a framework 
for possible experiments in implementation.  However, there are a number of possible issues that can 
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choice sets.  It would be reasonable to expect that these should be treated as measured with error.  
Measurement errors in non-linear models leads to issues of bias in parameter estimates that can be 
overcome, but only at considerable computational cost.   
However, estimation option 1 (using the actual stated attributes) does not overcome the issue.  If one 
assumes that individuals are constructing expected ecological outcomes based on the attributes, then 
the attributes themselves can only be considered as instruments for the actual constructed outcome 
used to make choices.  Any individual heterogeneity (or divergence from linearity in the production 
function) will mean they are instruments measured with error, and hence lead to bias (Gibson and 
Burton, 2009).   
More fundamentally, the issue arises post-estimation of how to deal, within a policy context, with 
heterogeneity in understanding i.e. in errors in the production function.  Heterogeneity in the utility 
function, from whatever source, may be accepted on the basis of the view that:  
“The individual may order all social states by whatever standards he deems relevant” (Arrow, 1951). 
But differences in the subjective production function means that some individuals are evaluating 
interventions on the basis of erroneous expectations.  In fact, such individuals would be disappointed 
if the policy choices they selected were acted upon because the experienced utility ex-post would not 
be what they were anticipating.  In this case, whose production function should be used?  One would 
anticipate that it should be the experts, which opens a further area of research: providing a consistent 
mapping and communication of outcomes between experts and public. 
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